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Transparency and financial reporting in mid-twentieth century 
British banking 
 
Abstract 
 
Until 1970, British banks were firm believers in the merits of ‘non-disclosure’, which 
obscured their ‘true’ profits and capital through profits smoothing and the use of 
hidden reserves.  Many other companies adopted the same view for as long as 
legislation permitted, but there were special reasons why non-disclosure endured for 
longer in banking.  This paper examines the persistence and demise of non-disclosure 
in banking, placing it in the context of the wider development of financial reporting in 
Britain, and highlights similarities and differences in financial reporting between 
banks and other types of company. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Transparency in modern financial reporting is considered crucial in helping users to 
understand, and reach their own conclusions about, businesses.  The volume of 
information available has reached levels not previously seen and continues to grow as 
reporting requirements become more extensive and voluntary disclosures are made for 
a variety of reasons.  There is wide acceptance that this long-term trend is appropriate 
in today’s business world with greater emphasis on corporate governance issues, 
driven by more demanding shareholders and other interested parties.  Major corporate 
scandals or crises, such as Enron in the USA and Equitable Life in the UK, prompt 
calls for increased transparency in financial reporting, although it is not obvious that 
reforms reduce the incidence of such events (Hooper and Kearins, 2007). 
 
But disclosure and the resulting transparency have not always been considered 
desirable in all circumstances.  An example is the banking sector in Britain, where 
only on publication of the major banks’ 1969 financial statements, an event referred to 
Transparency and financial reporting in mid-twentieth century British banking 
 
2 
in this paper as ‘disclosure’, did their ‘true’ profits and capital become known.  Banks 
enjoyed, at first through custom and practice and later through legal exemption, 
reporting requirements which permitted them to avoid reporting ‘true’ profits and 
capital.  The maintenance of ‘inner’ or ‘hidden’ reserves allowed banks to smooth 
their reported profits and understate their capital strength, thereby reassuring 
depositors and shareholders of their financial soundness and prudent behaviour 
through conservative accounting.   
 
This paper considers how and why this shift towards fuller disclosure in British banks’ 
financial reporting unfolded.  First we introduce the arguments for and against 
transparency in financial reporting by banks, followed by a description of the 
techniques used to support non-disclosure and some changes in banks’ published 
accounts over time.  We next compare the financial reporting practices of banks to 
those of other British companies, before discussing how the banks gained and later 
surrendered a unique legal status for their financial reporting.  We then consider 
explanations for the persistence and ultimate demise of non-disclosure before reaching 
a conclusion. 
 
2.  Financial reporting by banks and transparency 
 
2.1 The international regulatory consensus 
 
Currently the framework of banking regulation is extensive and there is a clear 
international consensus that transparency in banks’ financial reporting is desirable.  
Thus, the provision of information on a transparent and timely basis, reflected in Pillar 
3 of the Basel 2 Accord, is intended to allow more effective operation of market 
discipline by the providers of capital, depositors, and other market counterparties (see, 
for example, Heffernan, 2005, pp.203, 216-8).   
 
But while disclosure and transparency are considered fundamental in modern financial 
markets, significant international differences in these areas have been recognised.  
Banks in Japan and Germany, for instance, have been considered notably less 
transparent in their reporting than those in the UK or USA (see, for example, Sawabe 
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(2002) and ‘Japan’s banks: Surreal’, Economist, 20 April 2002, p.89).  However, 
international comparability should be enhanced by moves towards greater uniformity 
in financial reporting such as the recent adoption by EU-listed groups of International 
Financial Reporting Standards. 
 
2.2 Transparency and regulated disclosure 
 
A recent study, which relates the incidence of banking crises in the 1990s to the 
regulation of disclosures made by banks, characterised the arguments over disclosure 
in banking into two categories: ‘transparency-stability’ and ‘transparency-fragility’ 
(Tadesse, 2006).  The ‘transparency-stability’ view is reflected in the Basel 2 Accord: 
disclosure enhances transparency and improves information flows, thereby helping 
market discipline and leading to the more efficient allocation of resources, with sound 
banks rewarded and the unsound penalised.  The ‘transparency-fragility’ view, which 
prevailed in Britain until the 1970s, holds that ‘disclosure creates “negative 
externalities” ’ (Tadesse, 2006, p.34).  These include the possibility that disclosure 
that particular banks faced financial difficulties would stimulate bank-runs, which 
would disrupt the banking system as a whole and have wider negative economic 
consequences.   
 
This view has been reflected in attempts to curb banking transparency in different 
countries at different times.  For example, Bernal Lloréns (2004) reveals that in mid-
nineteenth century Spain publication of financial statements of banks became less 
frequent during periods of financial crisis.  In Italy in 1931-2 Mussolini’s government 
helped to prevent a crisis by suppressing information through ‘... the suspension of 
publication of regular accounts of balances and assets ...’ (James, 1992, p.611). 
 
3.  Non-disclosure in banks’ published accounts 
 
3.1 Background to non-disclosure and banking market structure 
 
This paper uses the term ‘non-disclosure’ to describe a number of techniques adopted 
by British banks before 1970 to obscure ‘true’ profits and capital and otherwise 
Transparency and financial reporting in mid-twentieth century British banking 
 
4 
present a different picture from the underlying reality.  These mainly reflect the non-
recognition of transactions or balances in the primary financial statements, or through 
a lack of description in the notes to the accounts. 
 
Many of the banks’ financial accounting practices arose from their origins as private 
banks and partnerships.  Most such banks had been absorbed in the amalgamation 
process which by 1920 had produced the ‘Big Five’ joint-stock banks in England and 
Wales, known by this date or within a few years as Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, 
National Provincial, and Westminster.  Together with a handful of smaller banks, the 
Big Five were ‘clearing banks’, with access to the London Clearing House through 
which cheques were cleared.  The Big Five retained shares of commercial bank 
deposits and advances in excess of 80 per cent until the late 1960s, but increasing 
financial sophistication and competition from other institutions eroded their share in 
the overall market for financial services, despite their attempts to diversify. 
 
The Big Five all made significant use of hidden reserves, and obscurity in financial 
reporting by banks was the norm.  Capie and Billings (2001) characterise the 1920s 
and 1930s as periods of profits smoothing, but other periods, notably the 1950s, as 
periods of profits understatement.  For the Big Five, ‘true’ capital always exceeded 
published capital during the period of non-disclosure, but the extent of understatement 
in published financial statements varied considerably from bank to bank and over time 
(Billings and Capie, 2007).  The example in Table 1 illustrates how the various 
practices contributing to non-disclosure could affect the published accounts of a major 
bank and these practices are now discussed in more detail.  [INSERT TABLE 1 
HERE] 
 
3.2 Profits smoothing and hidden reserves 
 
‘Profits smoothing’ was facilitated by the use of, and transfers to and from, ‘hidden’ 
or ‘inner’ reserves.  Hidden reserves resulted in the understatement of capital in 
published accounts, and in turn distorted other balance sheet figures because hidden 
reserve balances, as Table 1a illustrates, could be included in published deposits totals 
and/or netted off advances and/or investments.  Some banks maintained only one 
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hidden reserve, others several, and practices changed over time.  In the example given 
in Table 1a, the total hidden reserves amounted to around two-thirds of published 
capital, and part of these balances was deducted from investment headings in the 
balance sheet. 
 
Various devices were used in published accounts to indicate the existence and use of 
hidden reserves, such as subtleties in the wording and titles of balances or account 
headings (Edwards, 1981, pp.36-41; 1989, pp.138-9).  It was usual to show a single 
balance sheet heading ‘deposits and other accounts’, which included at least some part 
of hidden reserves.  Asset valuation policies, including accounting for fixed assets, 
investments and subsidiaries, were obscure, rarely clearly stated, and often contributed 
to profits smoothing (Capie and Billings, 2001).  For example, ‘... before World War 
One in the main it was probably undervaluation of assets wherein lay the greatest part 
of hidden reserves’ (Goodhart, 1972, p.20), including a tendency to over-provide for 
bad debts (Goodhart, 1972, pp.23-5). 
 
Valuations of bank premises remained an area of difference and ambiguity in 
published financial statements.  There was no generally accepted basis for valuation 
and only in the 1960s and 1970s did banks revalue properties to reflect increases in 
value (Capie and Billings, 2001, pp.237-8).  But there was an awareness of the 
implications of the valuations shown in published balance sheets.  For example, in 
1948 Barclays’ concern that its premises valuation was unrealistically low, failing to 
reflect market values, led to fears that this could result in inadequate compensation to 
shareholders in the event of nationalisation, then considered a realistic possibility.  
The bank investigated possible solutions to allow a higher valuation to be shown, 
although this came to nothing, as did a similar exercise in 1954 (Ackrill and Hannah, 
2001, pp.134-5). 
 
Banks sometimes made unambiguous statements to shareholders’ meetings to stress 
the conservativeness of their accounting and indicate that they were smoothing profits 
or making use of hidden reserves.  There were examples in 1902 and 1905 when 
significant undervaluations of bank premises were clearly signalled (Goodhart, 1972, 
pp.20-1).  Similar comments in chairmen’s statements or answers to shareholders’ 
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questions are found in later periods, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s and again in 
the 1950s, but more typically on matters such as ‘exceptional’ bad debts and 
investment profits and losses, rather than underlying profitability.  Examples include 
Lloyds’ 1925, 1927, 1930, 1931 and 1943 annual general meetings (AGMs) and the 
smaller Williams Deacon’s AGM in 1930. 
 
3.3 Balance sheet categorisation 
 
Although the published accounts of different banks show strong similarities in 
appearance, a consequence of non-disclosure was that many balance sheet categories 
lacked common definition between banks, and definitions used by individual banks 
changed over time.  Two examples can be noted.  Lloyds was concerned immediately 
after World War Two that its accounts appeared to show a smaller proportion of its 
assets in the form of customer lending than at other major banks.  This resulted from 
greater disaggregation in balance sheet presentation, with ‘Advances’, ‘Balances with 
Banks Abroad’, ‘Items in Transit’ and ‘Other Assets and Accounts’ shown as separate 
items, whereas other banks combined these categories (Lloyds TSB, Winton ‘Post-
War Reconstruction’: ‘Draft of Notes for Chairman of Meeting of Central 
Committee’, 14 January 1946).  A similar issue arose in 1961 when several banks 
made reclassifications between the balance sheet categories ‘Money at Call’, 
‘Advances’ and ‘Bills Discounted’ as a result of differences which emerged from the  
implementation of additional reporting requirements arising from the 1959 Radcliffe 
Report (BoE, EID 4/110).  The banks learned the lesson of such inconsistencies and 
prepared in great detail for disclosure in 1970. 
 
3.4 Window-dressing of cash balances 
 
The amount of cash shown on a bank’s balance sheet is one indicator of its soundness.  
The practice of ‘window-dressing’, which originated in the second half of the 
nineteenth century when banks began to publish balance sheets on a regular basis, was 
used by the clearing banks until the 1940s to inflate cash balances at balance sheet 
dates to give the appearance of greater liquidity.  There were various methods of 
window-dressing, such as the taking of deposits from other banks with different 
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balance sheet dates for short periods across year-ends.  Other methods included the 
shuffling of short-term assets just before balance sheet dates to boost cash balances, 
such as arranging that holdings of bills of exchange matured just prior to balance sheet 
dates and recalling short-term money market deposits.
1
  Through such methods Lloyds 
Bank, for example, systematically overstated its cash ratios, although the extent of 
overstatement varied over time - typically it showed cash representing more than 10 
per cent of total assets in published financial statements when the true ratios were 
between 9 and 10 per cent (Winton, 1982, pp.80-2). 
 
The Bank of England (‘the Bank’), concerned about the impact of window-dressing on 
cash ratios and hence on credit creation, estimated that window-dressing raised cash 
ratios overall by 1-2 per cent in both 1927 and 1930, but by at least 2 per cent in 1943 
and 1946 (BoE, EID 4/31 and EID 4/36).  Not all banks indulged in the practice to the 
same extent or, indeed, supported it.  During World War Two ‘... the Midland was 
strongly in favour of abandoning the practice and ... have so arranged their affairs for a 
number of years past as to avoid the necessity of window dressing’ (BoE, C40/101, 
Note to Governor, 30 July 1945).  Its official demise came at the end of 1946, by 
agreement between the banks prompted by the Bank, which then placed greater 
emphasis on a broader liquidity ratio.  Capie and Webber’s analysis of the clearing 
banks led them to conclude that ‘... there probably was a genuine attempt to cease 
doing this after 1946’ (1985, p.268), although some believe that manipulation 
continued after its official abandonment.  Indeed, the practice was apparently 
commonplace among the ‘secondary banks’ which developed in the 1960s and early 
1970s, including London & County Securities, which collapsed in a spectacular 
manner in 1973 (Matthews, 2005). 
 
3.5 Valuation of government securities 
 
The valuation of securities was another area of obscurity in bank balance sheets.  
Banks rarely held investments other than British government securities with fixed 
                                                          
1
  Capie and Webber (1985, pp.266-8) and Collins (1988, pp.241-3) provide detailed 
discussions of window-dressing. 
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maturity dates, ‘trade investments’ in other financial institutions, and small holdings 
in certain other types of fixed interest securities such as colonial government bonds.  
The traditional formula for the balance sheet valuation of fixed interest securities was 
to state these ‘at or below market value’.2 
 
In 1952, in response to a sharp fall in prices of government securities, four of the Big 
Five banks (the exception was National Provincial) changed their valuation basis to 
‘at or under cost and below redemption price’, with aggregate market value disclosed 
in a footnote when below balance sheet value, although the Companies Act 1948 did 
not require this.  Traditionally the banks sought to obscure falls in the value of such 
securities by deducting hidden reserve balances from balance sheet values to reduce 
the apparent size of unrealised losses, thereby signalling financial strength.  The 
banks’ fear that hidden reserve balances would be insufficient to cover unrealised 
depreciation prompted the changed valuation basis.
 3
  Some banks also purchased 
additional securities to inflate balance sheet figures to try to obscure falls in value (for 
example, Barclays - Ackrill and Hannah, 2001, p.138), a practice also followed in the 
early 1900s, if not earlier (Goodhart, 1972, p.25). 
 
In 1931, when similar circumstances to the 1950s had arisen, the banks drew on 
published reserves to write down balance sheet values of government securities, 
adjustments later reversed as securities prices rose.  The 1952 change in practice 
attracted much attention at the time (Economist, July 19 1952, pp.180-2; The Banker, 
August 1952, pp.63-71), although disclosure of market values produced little impact: 
‘The practice ... caused no stir in the market’ (Checkland, 1975, p.632).  This perhaps 
showed the weakness of the transparency-fragility view, and may ultimately have 
allowed the banks to move towards disclosure with fewer concerns. 
 
                                                          
2
  Ma (1982) found limited but suggestive evidence on the use of market prices for 
such valuations in the nineteenth century. 
3
  Billings and Capie (2007, p.151, Table 7) demonstrate the large fluctuations in 
unrealised profits and losses on investments between balance sheet dates.  Intra-year 
fluctuations could be more extreme. 
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At a time when the banks were still prevented from raising new capital, the changed 
practice in the 1950s caused private concerns at the Bank: ‘... it will be seen that the 
capital structure of the Clearing Banks is far from sound ... At present it is clear that in 
times of trouble they must either put footnotes on their balance sheets - which we 
deplore - or lean on us for financial aid, which would be disastrous ...’ (BoE, C40/102, 
note to Chief Cashier and The Governors, 26 September 1958).  Thus, the Bank 
viewed the banks’ use of such footnotes as a sign of weakness.  But it seems the Bank 
was inconsistent in its attitude, as the change in practice between the 1930s and 1950s 
was apparently based on the Bank Governor’s advice (Tuke and Gillman, 1972, pp.14, 
34-5). 
 
Historians of different banks view very differently the significance of unrealised 
losses on investments, despite their magnitude.  The historians of Lloyds and the 
Midland (supported by Capie and Billings, 2001, pp.228-9) do not consider such 
losses to be of great significance, whereas Barclays’ historians regard them more 
seriously (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001, pp.137-9; Holmes and Green, 1986, pp.219; 
Winton, 1982, p.163).  But the banks’ preoccupation with the valuation basis and 
disclosure of investments can be questioned.  Securities prices could be observed 
directly and inferences about the value of investments drawn from these.  
Furthermore, in the absence of liquidity pressures forcing the sale of fixed interest 
securities, those with fixed maturity dates (virtually all) could be held to maturity, 
limiting capital losses to any premiums paid over redemption prices.  This argument 
has persisted in recent debates over distinctions between ‘trading’ and ‘investment’ 
portfolios.  What is interesting is that the banks believed that fluctuating securities 
prices mattered, and chose to manipulate their financial statements to minimise the 
apparent impact. 
 
3.6 Securities holdings in industrial companies 
 
An intriguing issue relating to the disclosure of investments arose after 
implementation of the Companies Act 1929.  At this time Westminster Bank owned 
£500,000 6 per cent Preference Shares and £750,000 6 per cent Debentures in the 
Partington Iron and Steel Company, giving the bank beneficial ownership of 53 per 
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cent of the company.  Westminster was concerned that the Act would require 
disclosure of Partington as a subsidiary, but the bank and its auditors concluded that 
this was unnecessary as full provision had been made against the Westminster’s 
exposure and therefore no value was attributed to the bank’s holdings (RBS, 
WES/1174/47).
4
 
 
The strong desire to avoid showing an industrial company as a subsidiary reflects 
concerns about the disclosure of information during a sensitive period for banks and 
many of their customers, particularly those in traditional manufacturing industries.  
Westminster would have had several reasons for wishing to conceal its interest in 
Partington: a simple desire to protect customer confidentiality; an unwillingness to 
appear to be acting as a ‘universal’ bank on the stereotypical continental European 
model - although differences between the English and continental European systems 
may have been exaggerated (Collins, 1998); and the moral hazard issue of not wishing 
to signal to other industrial customers its preparedness to accept securities in place of 
straightforward short-term advances. 
 
 
4. Comparisons between banks and other companies 
 
Until the Companies Acts of 1947 and 1948 the legal position of banks in relation to 
financial reporting did not differ from that of other companies.  Arnold and Matthews 
(2002 [hereafter AM], p.14) agree with Maltby (2000) that these Acts were the 
catalysts for change in financial reporting generally, ‘rather than a change of position 
towards corporate disclosure on the part of the business community’.  We now 
compare the level of disclosure by banks to that of the wider population of companies 
in this period. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
   Tolliday (1987, pp.211-2) discusses Westminster’s relationship with Partington, 
part of the Pearson and Knowles Group, in turn 75% owned by Armstrong Whitworth. 
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4.1 Hidden reserves  
 
The professionalisation of auditing in the nineteenth century appears to have 
encouraged the general use of hidden reserves, not least as protection against 
shareholders with excessive dividend expectations.  Maltby (1999, p.29) argues that ‘a 
distinctive competence’ of and ‘an important contributing factor in the rise of the audit 
profession ... was its advice on prudent accounting’, one aspect of which was the use 
of hidden reserves, believed to be commonplace by the late nineteenth century 
(Napier, 1995, p.266), and defended by the ICAEW’s president in 1904 (Maltby, 
1999, pp.44-5).  The accounting profession was generally supportive of hidden 
reserves and ‘... the concept ... did, overall, receive approval from those witnesses [5] 
who gave evidence before the Greene [1925 Company Law Amendment] Committee’ 
(Edwards, 1976, p.280), with the example of banks cited to support this view (ibid: 
p.287; Bircher, 1991, p.60).   
 
Available evidence seems to support the view that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries banks were the most likely users of hidden reserves (Arnold, 1996, 
pp.47-9).  For example, the Midland, usually the largest bank before 1970, first 
established a hidden reserve (‘contingent fund’) in 1866 (Holmes and Green, 1986, 
pp.52 and 328).  Overall, the evidence on hidden reserves is unsatisfactory.  AM 
(pp.7, 12-13) and Edwards (1981, pp.35-41; 1989, pp.138-41) note that while the 
wordings and titles used in financial statements demonstrate the existence of hidden 
reserves and their use in profits smoothing, their extent is unclear.  Arnold (1997 and 
1998) provides evidence on the extent of hidden reserves over the period 1900-24, 
and, together with Edwards (1976, p.278) and Napier (1995, p.272), argues that the 
difficult economic conditions after World War One and uncertainties of wartime 
taxation encouraged a decline in the standards of financial reporting.  It is clear, 
however, that generalisations are problematic and there were notable industry 
variations, with particularly sharp declines in disclosures by shipping companies after 
World War One (Arnold, 1997).  
                                                          
5
   Including, for example, the eminent accountant Francis D’Arcy Cooper, chairman 
of Lever Brothers Limited (Edwards, 1989, p.149). 
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AM reviewed disclosure practices in the period 1920-50 for a sample of 50 of the 
UK’s largest listed companies drawn from a range of sectors, excluding financial 
institutions.  Their analysis of the wordings employed in accounts appears to indicate 
that the existence of hidden reserves in large non-banking companies increased 
between 1920 and 1935, although their use in smoothing profits diminished, in line 
with the implications of the Royal Mail group (hereafter RMG) case discussed below 
(AM, p.13).  For example, the use of the term ‘balance for the year’ in profit and loss 
accounts was regarded as a coded reference to the use of hidden reserves in smoothing 
profits (ibid: p.12).  Further evidence is provided by Arnold and Collier (2007), who 
show that in a sample of 21 of the largest 100 British industrial companies in 1948, 
two-thirds had made recent use of hidden reserves.  On average hidden reserves 
represented only around 10 per cent of total reserves in these companies, much less 
than in a typical bank, although their extent and treatment in published accounts 
varied greatly from company to company (ibid, pp.59-65). 
 
AM’s findings indicate some similarity in trends to the Big Five - an increasing 
number of items appearing in balance sheets and greater provision of consolidated 
accounts over time.  The Companies Act 1928 required publication of profit and loss 
accounts, increasing the number of non-banks publishing these.  Although the banks 
had published profit and loss accounts before this Act, their lack of detail persisted, 
with, as shown in Table 1b, only post-tax profits, dividends, and certain other 
appropriations shown until disclosure.   
   
The 1931 RMG case represented a turning point in attitudes to hidden reserves.  The 
defendants, the RMG chairman, Lord Kylsant, and the auditor, Harold Morland, a 
Price Waterhouse partner, were acquitted on charges relating to the production of false 
financial statements.  They elicited considerable sympathy in the business community 
and press, probably indicating that the circumstances of the case were not unusual 
(Green and Moss, 1982, pp.142-3; Jones, 1995, pp.145-57; Tuke and Gilman, 1972, 
pp.38-9).  Indeed, Napier (1991) demonstrated that many of the same accounting 
issues featured in the financial statements of another major shipping group, P & O.  
The RMG case was as much about the complexity of group structure and the 
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inadequate statutory requirements for group accounting as the question of hidden 
reserves.  But the verdicts implied that it was acceptable to use hidden reserves in 
smoothing profits only if signalled, a position which did not change until the 
Companies Act 1947 (Bircher, 1988a).  Following the case, British American 
Tobacco, as a sign of its financial strength, chose to draw to the attention of its 
shareholders at its 1932 AGM that it held hidden reserves (Cox, 2000, pp.314-5). 
 
4.2 Consolidated accounts 
 
Consolidated group accounts, the publication of which has been described as ‘... 
arguably, the major twentieth century innovation concerning external financial 
reporting procedures’ (Edwards, 1991, p.130), were required by the Companies Act 
1947, which permitted alternatives, the main one being the publication of accounts for 
individual subsidiaries.  The first-known example of a consolidated balance sheet 
published by a British company is that of the Pearson and Knowles Coal and Iron 
Company Ltd. in 1910 (Edwards, 1991).  Edwards (1981, pp.28, 30) notes that the UK 
was slow to adopt a requirement for consolidated accounts and suggests some reasons 
for this (also see Bircher 1988b).  In 1935 only seven of the AM sample of 50 major 
companies presented some form of consolidated accounts, whereas by 1950 all did so. 
 
The Big Five banks first published consolidated group accounts at different dates.  
Lloyds did not present such accounts until 1967, when the increasing number of 
subsidiaries presumably made the main alternative approach impractical.  But 
Midland first published consolidated accounts in 1929, Barclays and National 
Provincial in 1948, and Westminster in 1957.  Barclays, with extensive overseas 
interests, was probably the bank for which consolidated accounts would have added 
most information to that already in the public domain.  It is unclear why consolidated 
accounts were first published at different dates.  As the various banking groups did not 
use long-term debt until the late 1960s (Billings and Capie, 2007), explanations based 
on gearing levels, which could be concealed or manipulated in the absence of 
consolidated accounts, appear irrelevant.   
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5. Changing financial reporting in British banking 
 
The Companies Act 1947 required publication of consolidated accounts for groups 
and prohibited the existence of hidden reserves.  But certain companies, ‘banking or 
discount’, insurance, and shipping companies, were exempted from its full rigour, 
under Part III of the Act’s First Schedule, more commonly referred to as the 
exemptions of Part III of the Eighth Schedule of the consolidating 1948 Companies 
Act.  These exemptions reflected previously accepted custom and practice: the use of 
hidden reserves was permitted; profit and loss accounts needed to show only profits 
after tax and after transfers to or from hidden reserves; and there was no requirement 
to disclose the bases of asset valuation.  British banks had sought, achieved and then 
later surrendered this peculiar reporting status.  Key developments are discussed in 
this section.   
 
5.1 Financial reporting reform under the 1947 Companies Act 
 
The financial reporting environment began to change in the 1930s following the well-
known RMG case, discussed above.  ‘Recommendations on Accounting Principles’, 
issued by the Taxation and Financial Relations Committee, formed in 1942, of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) addressed issues 
such as hidden reserves and group accounts (Napier, 1995, p.274) and were reflected 
in the Cohen Committee Report (1945), which provided the basis for the Companies 
Acts 1947 and 1948.  Maltby (2000) argues that these acts were a response to the 
financial scandals of the 1920s and 1930s, and the wartime experience and acceptance 
of greater state regulation (see also Bircher 1988a; Edwards 1989, pp.207-209). 
 
The written evidence of the Committee of London Clearing Bankers (‘CLCB’) to the 
Cohen Committee neglected to mention banks’ hidden reserves (CLCB, 1943).  In 
November 1943, in anticipation of questioning by the Committee, Lloyds sought 
information from other banks as to any questions received on this subject at AGMs 
(Lloyds TSB, HO/L/Com/3).  The banks’ oral evidence in January 1944 (Cohen 
Evidence, 1944, questions 4626 and 4728-4743) was sufficient to secure the 
exemptions granted under the 1947 and 1948 Acts. 
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The basis of the banks’ arguments was that they could experience large fluctuations in 
investment values and irregular patterns of loan losses disproportionate to profits in 
any single year, the full disclosure of which could cause depositors and the general 
public to lose confidence.  In addition, if foreign depositors lost confidence, sterling 
could be damaged, an important consideration in the postwar fixed exchange rate 
environment.  In extreme cases, the disclosure of a large bad debt provision could 
undermine the debtor, which would be against the interests of a range of relevant 
parties.  A consistent theme in the arguments used to support non-disclosure was the 
priority given to: ‘... the interests of the depositors ... [which] outweigh the interests of 
shareholders’ (Cohen Committee Report, 1945, para. 101).  The Committee’s report 
referred to the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s and clearly the economic problems 
of the interwar period weighed heavily in the Committee’s judgement.   
 
5.2 Challenges to non-disclosure and its demise 
 
The typical response of bankers to questions about hidden reserves was along the lines 
of: ‘... internal reserves are of a somewhat shy disposition and do not like exposing 
themselves in the public gaze’ (Lloyds Bank, Deputy Chairman, 1925 AGM).  By the 
beginning of the 1960s, however, attitudes had started to shift and the issue of non-
disclosure came under scrutiny by the Jenkins Committee on Company Law.  The 
CLCB’s written evidence to the Committee (CLCB, 1960) placed great stress on non-
disclosure as a foundation for stability in the banking sector, arguing that the position 
had not changed since the Cohen Report, emphasising that depositors’ interests were 
paramount, and drew attention to the possibility of wide fluctuations in banks’ profits 
from year to year, citing as an example the impact of big falls in gilts prices in the 
1950s. 
 
The Jenkins Committee recommended by a majority the retention of bank disclosure 
exemptions, although five out of fourteen members (‘the dissenters’) favoured their 
removal (Board of Trade, 1962, paras. 211-216).  The minority view was shared by 
many commentators, for example: ‘The present secrecy makes it strangely possible … 
to appear to be simultaneously stingy to staff, grasping to borrowers, mean to 
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depositors and parsimonious to shareholders’ (Bankers Magazine, 1962, May, p.395).  
The dissenters suggested that the banks could publish three- or five-yearly profit and 
loss accounts to overcome some of the objections to publishing ‘true’ annual profits 
(Board of Trade, 1962, para. 215), a suggestion effectively reflected in the ‘Leach-
Lawson rules’, which are discussed below.6 
 
The Jenkins Committee’s report produced no immediate changes, but pressure on the 
banks for fuller disclosure grew with the election of a Labour government in 1964.  
The bankers were put on notice that their exemptions were at risk at a meeting with 
the Board of Trade (BoT) on 26 March 1965 (NA, T326/922, 19 November 1965 
report, para. 4).  The dissenters had recommended that the banks be invited to submit 
their true accounts in confidence to the BoT to allow consideration of the implications 
of disclosure before the exemptions were changed (BoT, 1962, para. 217).  BoT 
accountants produced a report based on data supplied by two commercial banks, 
Midland and Bank of Scotland, two British overseas banks, Chartered Bank and the 
Bank of London and South America, a discount house (Alexanders) and a merchant 
bank (Brown Shipley) (NA, T326/922, 19 November 1965 report). 
 
Two key meetings between bankers and government took place in 1966, at both of 
which the bankers asserted the arguments in favour of non-disclosure (RBS, 
WES/595/30, CLCB meeting notes).  At the first meeting with the BoT on 11 August 
1966, issues such as competitive disadvantage by comparison to banks in other 
countries, the practicality of change, and the nature of banks’ shareholders were raised 
as arguments against disclosure.  The tone of the notes of this meeting suggests that 
the banks exhibited the same apparently aggressive attitude to criticism that they had 
displayed in the 1930s (Newton, 2003, p.163).  The second meeting on 22 November 
1966 also involved the Chancellor of the Exchequer, although essentially featured the 
same arguments.  The pressures for fuller disclosure were reinforced by official 
reports on the banking sector by the National Board for Prices and Incomes (1967) and 
the Monopolies Commission, which saw:  ‘... no justification for banks of the size and 
                                                          
6
   Luther (2003) provides a history of non-annual financial statements, found in 
ventures such as shipping, mining and insurance. 
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strength of the leading clearing banks continuing to conceal their true accounts’ 
(Monopolies Commission, 1968, para. 278). 
 
The position of the Bank appears ambivalent.  Cairncross, the government’s economic 
adviser, who had been present at a private dinner on 9 August 1966, two days before 
the first meeting with the BoT, at which several bank chairmen discussed disclosure 
with the Bank’s Governor, Leslie O’Brien, noted that the Governor had pressed the 
bankers to consider disclosure (Kynaston, 2001, p.346).
7
   The Bank continued to 
support non-disclosure in private comments to the Treasury, but it ‘was a cause for 
which the Governor was unwilling to fight’ (Kynaston, 2001, p.347).  Points raised in 
favour of disclosure were the equity of treatment between all public companies and 
the potential economic benefits from transparency.  However, the Bank’s list of 
arguments against disclosure was longer and reflected the view that banks were 
‘special’: bank shareholders were satisfied with non-disclosure, due to the ‘less 
speculative quality of bank equity’; banks had a public policy role and shareholders 
could not expect profit-maximisation and a competitive dividend policy; it would 
bring into the open conflicts between shareholder and the public interest; British 
banks would be placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to banks operating in 
other jurisdictions; there was the remote possibility of a large customer provision 
being reflected in published figures; the anxiety of banks to avoid bad debts could lead 
to excessively conservative credit standards; and, finally, it could be negative for 
sterling if profits were seen to be falling at a time when the currency was under 
pressure - devaluation, of course, came in 1967 (BoE, G14/71, note on ‘Companies 
Bill: Future of Eighth Schedule’, sent under cover of letter dated 31 October 1966 
from the Governor to Sir William Armstrong). 
 
The Companies Act 1967 (Part I, Schedule 12) gave the BoT power to withdraw the 
1948 Act’s exemptions and thus force disclosure.  In the interim, continuing 
exemption was conditional on the submission of ‘true’ figures to the Bank which 
                                                          
7
  A note of this dinner by Stirling, Westminster’s chairman, makes no reference to the 
Governor, dealing mainly with the comments of Sir William Armstrong, the senior 
Treasury official (RBS, WES/595/30). 
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passed them in unattributed form to the BoT, which used these figures for 1967 and 
1968 to produce a second report covering the whole banking sector (NA, T326/922, 
30 May 1969 report).  Although both BoT reports confirmed the banks’ assertions of 
volatility in their ‘true’ profits, they also helped reinforce the view in government that 
for the large banks, most of whose business was domestic, non-disclosure was 
allowing them to conceal very strong financial positions and the ‘transparency-
fragility’ argument therefore lacked credibility. 
 
Some banks had begun to favour fuller disclosure.  Thomson, Barclays’ chairman, 
indicated in evidence to the Monopolies Commission that his own bank would not 
object to disclosure, but that others were against (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001, p.178; 
Monopolies Commission, 1968, para. 209).  The newly-merged National Westminster 
was privately in favour of disclosure (RBS, NWB/1821/1: Memoranda to Board, 8 
October and 3 December 1968) and told the Bank this (RBS, NWB/1571/9, note by 
D.J. Robarts, Chairman, of visit to Bank’s Deputy Governor, 30 June 1969). 
 
In the summer of 1969 the major London banks decided collectively through the 
CLCB to undertake disclosure voluntarily before it was imposed on them through 
withdrawal of their legal exemptions.  The CLCB decided that standardisation of the 
banks’ financial reporting was necessary before disclosure could take place.  The 
CLCB had retained the services of the eminent accountants Ronald Leach
8
 and Sir 
William Lawson
9
 since October 1966, when the banks decided they would need 
professional assistance in presenting their case to government.  Standardisation was 
based on a memorandum prepared by Leach and Lawson which made 
                                                          
8
  ICAEW president, 1969-70, and the first chairman of the Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee from 1970. 
9
  ICAEW president, 1957-8, and a Jenkins Committee dissenter, he had drafted the 
dissenting note (RBS, WES/595/30: CLCB informal note, 30 November 1966).   His 
brother, H.B. (later Sir Henry) Lawson, served as Deputy Chief General Manager of 
Lloyds Bank and gave oral evidence to the Cohen Committee in 1944 as a CLCB 
representative when Principal of Lloyds’ Legal Department (Lloyds TSB, 
HO/L/Com/3). 
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recommendations to overcome the ‘... lack of generally accepted accounting principles 
as to the determination of banking profits in the United Kingdom’ (Barclays, 296-31, 
Memorandum on ‘Ascertainment of Banking Profits’, 31 July 1969).   These 
recommendations came to be referred to as the ‘Leach-Lawson rules’ and were 
implemented by a special working group of the CLCB.  The accounts for 1969, the 
first to disclose ‘true’ profits and capital, were published in February 1970.  However, 
the ‘rules’ did not produce complete transparency and it was not until 1979 that the 
banks abandoned their most important elements on the treatment of bad debts and 
profits and losses on investments, which essentially smoothed over five years these 
important sources of fluctuation in bank performance (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001, 
pp.201, 258; Accountancy, March 1979, p.26). 
 
Bank chairmen made the best of disclosure, claiming they were in favour, as some 
undoubtedly were, feeling that it was time for the banks to reassert their competitive 
nature after spending much of the period since World War Two subject to various 
forms of implicit and explicit government control.  For example, National 
Westminster’s chairman declared: ‘I am glad that we can now give the shareholder, 
customer and staff a better understanding of their bank ... It will also, I feel, lead to a 
sharpening of competition and to even greater efficiency in banking’ (National 
Westminster Bank, 1970, Chairman’s Statement).   
 
5.3 The British overseas banks 
 
An aside to the affairs of the major banks was the position of the British-owned banks 
with significant international interests, particularly in colonies and ex-colonies.  At the 
time of the Jenkins Committee they held special concerns that loss of their exemptions 
would disadvantage them, fearing that disclosure of higher than expected reserves 
would expose them to higher taxation, excessive wage claims, and even expropriation 
or nationalisation.  Alternatively, the disclosure of lower than expected reserves would 
result in crises of confidence threatening stability.   Disclosure could lead to less risky 
lending and in turn limit profitability (Barclays, 38-873, note of 30 January 1961). 
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Differences appeared among the British overseas banks as disclosure approached.  
Barclays’ position differed from the other ‘Big Five’ banks, with a significant 
overseas element to the group’s activities through its subsidiary Barclays D.C.O., later 
Barclays International (Barclays, 80-2105).    By July 1969, D.C.O.’s  chairman was 
viewing disclosure favourably, considering that its profitability and reserves in the 
countries where it operated were lower than believed and that political pressures in 
these countries had diminished.  However, his view was not shared by the chairmen of 
the other British overseas banks (Barclays, 38-873, Seebohm memorandum of 9 
September 1969 and responses from other banks).  In the end, D.C.O., with 45 per 
cent of its shares held by minority shareholders, chose unilateral disclosure. 
 
6. Explanations for the persistence and demise of non-disclosure in 
banking 
 
6.1 Trust and the absence of crisis 
 
Nineteenth century legislative changes affecting the banks had resulted from crises 
such as the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878, which led to the Companies 
Act 1879.  The absence of crisis in twentieth century British banking eliminated one 
source of pressure over non-disclosure - the system was seen to work and the absence 
of obvious failure in the banking sector provided the supporters of non-disclosure with 
a powerful argument.  The banks, to their long-term commercial benefit, had earned 
trust and credibility.  While non-disclosure implied some conflict of interest between 
depositors and shareholders, in that undisclosed transfers to hidden reserves limited 
profits available for distribution as dividends, it assisted the long-term survival of 
banks during periods of difficulty.  Acceptance of ‘non-disclosure’ required a high 
degree of trust between the parties.  Whereas trust is now established through 
transparency, previously it had been built on experience.  The arguments of O’Neill 
(2002) that excessive, intrusive, or the wrong type of, transparency may weaken trust 
provide a modern underpinning for financial reporting practices now regarded as 
highly anachronistic. 
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The British banking system was enormously stable during the period of non-
disclosure.  Worries that fundamental problems in the sector might have been 
concealed would have been misplaced - the larger banks were always reasonably well-
capitalised, despite occasional difficult periods over bad debts and volatile securities 
prices (Billings and Capie, 2007).  Whatever the objections to non-disclosure, no 
significant bank failed during this period, and although some struggled in the difficult 
macroeconomic conditions of the late 1920s and early 1930s, this would also surely 
have occurred had disclosures been fuller.
10
 
 
Various problems and bank failures arose after disclosure had taken place.  There 
were those in the secondary banking crisis in 1973-4, at which time National 
Westminster was feared to be suffering liquidity problems (Kynaston, 2001, p.510).  
These difficulties led to the Banking Act 1979.  The failure of Johnson Matthey 
Bankers in 1984 was instrumental in the Banking Act 1987.  Another notable failure 
was that of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 due to 
money-laundering and fraud, and one factor in its demise was a lack of clarity as to 
which national regulator(s) should regulate it.  The 1995 Barings case is well-known.  
Arguably none of these failures could be directly attributed to deficiencies in financial 
reporting, arising rather from macroeconomic mismanagement coupled with financial 
sector liberalisation, audit and regulatory failures, frauds of various types, and internal 
control weaknesses.  In a study of one of the secondary banks, Matthews (2005) 
argues that deficiencies in financial reporting in that company were part of a wider 
failure.  Disclosure, therefore, should be seen as a significant event, but part of a 
broader and more complex picture. 
 
6.2 The relationship between banks and government and the changing banking market 
 
Many commentators consider that the clearing banks operated a cartel in their main 
markets for loans and deposits during the period 1920-70, although arguably this 
                                                          
10
   For example, the Bank promoted the takeover of two small weak banks: Williams 
Deacon’s in 1930 and Glyn, Mills & Co. in 1939, both taken over by the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (Sayers, 1976, pp.252-9). 
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oversimplifies a complicated situation (Capie and Billings, 2004).  One reason for the 
persistence of this market structure was that governments and the Bank found it a 
convenient instrument of economic policy in an environment in which they had to 
deal with a limited number of significant institutions.  Under what a recent report on 
banking competition described as the ‘the old regulatory contract’, banks enjoyed 
special treatment as part of: ‘... an informal contract between successive governments 
and banks, designed to deliver public confidence in the banking system.  In return for 
cooperating in the delivery of government objectives, the banking industry escaped the 
rigours of effective competition’ (Cruickshank, 2000, p.vii). 
 
This argument can be framed in terms of the political costs hypothesis of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986).  Non-disclosure allowed the banks to conceal their true profits, 
disclosure of which could have produced ‘political costs’ in the form of demands from 
shareholders for higher dividends, aware of the existence but not extent of hidden 
reserves, and political pressures for higher taxation of bank profits in a climate of 
dividend restraint.  The privilege of non-disclosure was granted as part of the implicit 
regulatory bargain in which the banks acted as a monetary policy tool, albeit an 
imperfect one.  Thus non-disclosure was an arrangement which led to an efficient 
outcome in minimising political costs. 
 
Many business historians have noted the impact of the Companies Act 1948 reforms 
in stimulating the wave of takeovers of public companies in Britain in the 1950s (for 
example, Wilson, 1995, p.202).  Non-disclosure in banking could be regarded as a 
self-serving device to prevent takeovers and restrict market entry.  Hong Kong 
provides an international example where non-disclosure seems to have inhibited the 
operation of the market for corporate control and protected the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation from takeover (Boyns and Edwards, 1991, p.192). 
 
A mixture of factors appears to account for the shift in attitudes to competition.  By 
the end of the 1960s the banks had come to the view that they would prefer to operate 
in a more competitive environment.  The laissez-faire regulatory instincts of the Bank, 
which had long resented its own role in implementing government restrictions on the 
banking sector, were leaning in the same direction. 
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The end of non-disclosure coincided with the injection of greater competition into 
British banking.  The domestic industry structure was changing through mergers.  In 
1968 Barclays absorbed the Liverpool-based Martins, and the two smallest Big Five 
banks combined to form the National Westminster.  The mergers intensified domestic 
competition but also undercut the transparency-fragility argument - with a ‘Big Four’, 
the major banks were now considered ‘too big to fail’.  Quantitative and qualitative 
controls on lending imposed at various times after World War Two had left demand 
for bank lending unsatisfied as banks charged interest rates below market-clearing 
levels, leading to the emergence of a variety of institutions which attempted to meet 
this demand.  The introduction of Competition and Credit Control in 1971 was 
intended to contribute to a more competitive environment.  American banks too were 
making an increasing impact, particularly in the market for corporate business 
(Battilossi and Cassis, 2002).   
 
6.3 Bankers’ attitudes to disclosure, the position of shareholders, the role of 
dividends, and capital-raising 
 
The reluctance of banks to disclose information extended beyond financial reporting: 
‘Bankers were assertively firm in their defence of secrecy in reporting even basic 
company information’ (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001, p.153).  For example, their 
evidence to the Macmillan Committee in 1930 understated the extent of their 
commitment to industrial lending at the risk of exposing themselves to criticism in 
this regard (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001, p.95). 
 
Bankers had long been sceptical of the ability of shareholders, the press and other 
outside parties to interpret correctly their ‘true’ financial results if these were made 
available, symptomatic of what Newton (2003, p.151) characterised as ‘the prevailing 
arrogance in many of the statements’ made in the Banker’s Magazine in the interwar 
period.  Such attitudes, not confined to bankers (Bircher, 1988b), were reflected in the 
low priority attached to the interests of shareholders, reinforced by the inability of, or 
need for, the banks to raise new capital.  After the consolidation of the Big Five, there 
were few dividend changes until the 1960s, sometimes reflecting voluntary restraint 
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and at other times due to public policy.  Arguably bank shares represented quasi-fixed 
interest securities and were judged on that basis by investors (Rutterford, 2004), 
supporting the Bank’s comment on ‘the less speculative quality of bank equity’.11 
 
The capital needs of the banks help to explain why the forces seeking the 
abandonment of non-disclosure started to gain ground.  In the 1960s, the passage of 
time since the gilts problems of the 1950s allowed the banks to exercise the 
managerial discretion afforded by non-disclosure to rebuild their hidden reserves 
(RBS, WES/595/30, CLCB note of dinner at Bank of England, 11 October 1966).
12
  
But for the first time in several decades the banks raised new share capital through 
rights issues in 1959, with further issues in the 1960s.  The Capital Issues Committee 
had controlled new issues of shares from early in World War Two and the banks were 
obliged to wait to make share issues they felt were long overdue (Billings and Capie, 
2007).  Modern finance theory highlights the signalling role to shareholders about 
future corporate prospects played by reported profits and dividends.  More accurate 
signalling of current profits, to reduce the information asymmetries faced by 
shareholders, would have become more important in the support of capital-raising, 
thus reinforcing pressures for greater disclosure.  We have not identified any evidence 
of direct pressure on banks from shareholders or the London Stock Exchange in 
favour of disclosure, but this issue featured in bankers’ discussions of the merits of 
disclosure, for example at National Westminster: ‘... stock exchange opinion is in 
favour of greater provision of information to shareholders and the investing public 
generally ... [and] ... the banks are placed at a disadvantage when seeking new capital, 
                                                          
11
  From 1947-58 undistributed profits were taxed at lower rates than distributed 
profits (Thomas, 1978, pp.230-5).  The introduction of Corporation Tax in 1965 had a 
similar effect.  Thus, ironically, it can be argued that, in the absence of capital gains 
tax, not introduced until the 1960s, the banks were acting in shareholders’ interests in 
accumulating reserves through undistributed profits, but there is no evidence that the 
banks ever considered such arguments. 
12
  A parallel can be found in nineteenth century France, where industrial companies 
financed growth from internal resources, with the need to ensure adequate retentions 
strongly influencing financial reporting practice (Lemarchand, 1993). 
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because they are prevented from raising funds on terms truly commensurate with the 
value of their shares’ (RBS, NWB/1821/1, Memorandum for Mr. D.J. Robarts, 24 
June 1969). 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The gradual evolution of accounting regulation in financial reporting in Britain noted 
by many authors was also found in the banking sector.  But banks were permitted to 
continue with a lack of transparency in their financial reporting for much longer than 
other companies.  Voluntary disclosures made by banks were very limited, but would 
have given clear signals to those who noted them.  The acceptance of non-disclosure 
for such a long period suggests that those who used banks’ financial statements were 
under few illusions about what they were reading. 
 
The banks clearly made a persuasive case for special treatment: it survived company 
law amendment committees, the Royal Mail case, the postwar legislative change 
which constrained the financial reporting options of other types of company, and the 
nationalisation of the Bank of England.  But financial reporting by banks was not 
immune to the wider pressures for change in financial reporting, and general 
dissatisfaction with published financial statements made the banks’ position appear 
anomalous.  It was not until other companies were forced to report on a more 
transparent basis that banks were obliged to articulate more clearly their arguments 
that disclosure would create negative externalities.  Non-disclosure came under 
serious challenge only in the 1960s, and the domestic commercial banks opted for 
collective abandonment of the practice before their privileged position was removed 
from them, as it surely would have been. 
 
The Bank of England played a significant role in non-disclosure, generally supporting 
the practice, but initiating both the abandonment of ‘window-dressing’ and the change 
in the method of valuation for securities in the 1950s, which it later seemed to regret.  
Its stance on disclosure in the late 1960s seems ambivalent, continuing to present the 
arguments for non-disclosure to government while also encouraging the banks to 
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consider disclosure, but this may simply have reflected the Bank’s assessment of the 
inevitability of disclosure. 
 
Non-disclosure now appears anachronistic, and it seems curious that user groups were 
willing to accept financial statements that all parties knew could be misleading.  But 
non-disclosure had long-standing historical roots and, for most of the period 
examined, those most closely involved believed the policy to be in their individual 
and collective interests, and were generally content to trust bankers to behave 
responsibly, which they appear to have done.  ‘Disclosure’ in 1970 did not result in 
fully transparent financial statements for British banks, but it brought their financial 
reporting closer to that of other companies.  It was only after disclosure, which 
coincided with wider changes in the financial sector and rapid economic change, that 
significant problems in the banking sector emerged, but we can only speculate as to 
whether disclosure contributed to these. 
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Table 1: Illustrative example, Lloyds Bank 1949 
 
Table 1a: Balance sheet at 31 December 1949 
 Accounting 
records 
 
 
£000 
Adjustment 
of hidden 
reserve 
balances 
 £000 
Published 
financial 
statements 
 
£000 
Comments 
Cash and balances at Bank of 
England 
93,077  93,077 wd 
Balances with other banks and 
cheques in course of collection 
41,302  41,302 wd 
Money at call and short notice 112,025  112,025 wd 
Bills discounted 195,234  195,234 wd 
Treasury Deposit Receipts 140,500  140,500 short-term British government debt 
British government securities 249,646 -5,500 244,146 valuation basis usually unclear - see section 3.5 
Trade and other investments 34,133 -750 33,383 valuation basis usually unclear - see section 3.5 
Advances to customers 292,500  292,500 hidden reserves were sometimes deducted from the advances 
total 
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 Accounting 
records 
 
 
£000 
Adjustment 
of hidden 
reserve 
balances 
 £000 
Published 
financial 
statements 
 
£000 
Comments 
Premises 7,013  7,013 valuation basis and depreciation policy usually unclear 
Investments in group companies 3,566  3,566 typically valued at cost, hidden reserves sometimes deducted 
     
Total assets 1,168,996 -6,250 1,162,746  
     
Share capital 15,810  15,810  
Reserve fund 14,300  14,300  
Profit and loss account 601  601  
Sundry creditors 507  507  
Deposits and other accounts 1,118,118 13,410 1,131,528 some hidden reserves usually included under this heading 
Hidden reserves 19,660 -19,660 - nd 
     
Total liabilities 1,168,996 -6,250 1,162,746  
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Table 1b: Profit and loss account for year ended 31 December 1949 
 Accounting 
records 
 
£000 
Published 
financial 
statements 
£000 
Comments 
Profit before Tax 7,013 nd  
Tax payable -4,366 nd  
Profit after Tax 2,647 nd  
Transfers to hidden reserves -938 nd  
Published net profit after tax 1,709 1,709 in published financial statements, neither tax payable nor undisclosed transfers 
to/from hidden reserves were shown in arriving at this figure 
Dividends payable -988 -988  
Transfer to reserves -700 -700 sometimes included disclosed transfers to hidden reserves 
Balance brought forward -580 -580  
Balance carried forward 601 601  
 
wd = short-term assets subject to ‘window-dressing’ in earlier periods - see section 3.4 
nd = not disclosed in published financial statements 
Sources: Lloyds Bank (1950); Lloyds TSB, HO/CA/Acc/18. 
